THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ACT:
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT'S NEGLIGENCE ON
REIMBURSEMENT
whether a Government which has paid compensation
to an injured employee may be reimbursed from the employee's recovery in tort against a third party, in spite of the Government's concurrent negligence in causing his injury, was the subject of a recent
case, Randall v. United States.1 A government employee traveling on
official business aboard a commercial airline was killed in a mid-air
collision, and his widow received compensation under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act 2 Test cases arising out of the accident, which
were stipulated as binding on all litigants, determined that both the
airline pilot and the government tower operators were negligent."
Following a settlement by the airline with the deceased's widow, 4 the
Government brought suit against the widow in the district court and
successfully asserted that its payment of FECA compensation should be
refunded from her recovery against the airline. 5 The Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that the negligence of the Government did not bar
its complete reimbursement. 6
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282

QUESTION

F.zd
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196o),

tetition for cert. filed, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3190

(U.S. Dec. 16, 196o) (No. 588).
'39 Stat. 742, 5 U.S.C. §§ 751-95 (9xg6).

The beneficiary of compensation under

the FECA may be required to sue the third party or assign his cause of action to the
United States. Federal Employees' Compensation Act § 26, 39 Stat. 747, 5 U.5.C. § 776
(1916).

8 Union Trust Co. v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 8o (D.D.C. 1953) ; Eastern Air
Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United States v. Union Trust
Co., 350 U.S. 907 (955); Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 239 F.2d 25 (D.C.
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 942 (-957).
'Federal Employee's Compensation Act § 27, 39 Stat. 747-48, 5 U.S.C. § 777
(x916).
r The United States had to assert its lien on the money paid to the widow rather
than proceed directly against Eastern Air Lines for contribution. United States v. Klein,
153 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 194.6).
'The decision in this case reversed a unanimous ruling by the same court that
the tort action against Eastern Air Lines was brought by the widow on behalf of
Randall's estate and not on her personal behalf. This conclusion was based on the
argument that the purpose of the payments under the FECA to the appellant as widow
was to "cmeet ordinary living expenses" and foreclose the "necessity of seeking charity or
reliance upon the help of friends," S. REP. No. 836, 8ist Cong., ist Sess. 13 0949) ,
whereas the tort damages from Eastern Air Lines were based on the entire lifetime
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This case is the first under the FECA in which a government employee has been injured under circumstances in which both the Government and a third party were held to be negligent. Under the FECA,
a government employee cannot bring a negligence action against the
Government for his injuries,7 but here the Government's negligence had
been established in previous suits brought by other passengers under the
Federal Tort Claims Act." Despite the fact that the decision sustaining
reimbursement was based on a literal interpretation of the refund provision of the FECA,9 it appears that the case involved a situation never
contemplated by Congress."°
The rule that the employer's concurrent negligence does not bar his
reimbursement'1 finds support in previous cases involving suits by or on
pecuniary loss to the widow. See generally Rankin v. Shayne Bros., Inc., 234 F.zd
35 (D.C. Cir. 1956) i Tate v. Nelson, 71 F. Supp. 465 (D.D.C. 1947).
The final ruling, noting that an administratrix is prohibited from paying any of the
deceased's debts out of a tort recovery for a wrongful death (D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-12o3
(i95i)) and that the entire amount is allocated to the spouse and next of kin (D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-i2oi (1951)) concluded that the widow's suit against Eastern was on
her own behalf. The author of the court's first opinion dissented on the theory that the
statutory compensation should be the measure of the government's liability for its negligence.
"A government employee's exclusive remedy against the government is to accept
compensation. Federal Employees' Compensation Act § 2ox, added by 63 Stat. 86.,
as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 7 5 7 (b) (195o).
a 6o Stat. 842 (1946) (Codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
"The Federal Employees' Compensation Act § 27, 39 Stat. 747-4.8, 5 U.S.C. § 777
(i9x6), provides that "if an injury or death for which compensation is payable under
this Act is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other
than the United States to pay damages therefore, and a beneficiary entitled to compensation from the United States receives, as a result of a suit brought by him or on his
behalf . . . any money . . . in satisfaction of the liability of such other person, such
beneficiary shall . . . apply the money or other property so received in the following
manner: (A) if his compensation has been paid in whole or in part, he shall refund
to the United States the amount of compensation which has been paid by the United
States .... "
The widow argued that this refund obligation should be limited to situations in
which the third party tort-feasor was exclusively or solely liable for the employee's
injury.
"0When the FECA was passed in 1916, thirty years before the Tort Claims Act,
fault on the part of the government was irrelevant as to either an employee or a thirdparty plaintiff, as Eastern attempted to become in the original case.
The only legislation found to have considered the joint negligence situation denies
the benefits of third party practice to a negligent employer. 48 ILL. ANN. STAT.

§ 166 (1913).
"' United Gas Corp. v. Guillory, 2o6 F.zd 49 (5th Cir. 1953); Baker v. Traders
& Gen. Ins. Co., i99 F.zd 289 (ioth Cir. -195z ) 5 Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller & Paine,
240 F. 376 (8th Cir. 1917); Marciniak v. Pennsylvania R.R., 152 F. Supp. 89 (D.
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behalf of the employer against a third party. Although in these cases
the employer was partially responsible for the employee's injuries, he
was allowed to recover because he is viewed as standing in the employee's shoes.- 2 Courts that take this position place the entire financial
burden on the third party by rationalizing that the third party's common law position has not been altered by modern compensation statutes.
At common law the injured employee could have elected to sue the third
party alone, and the third party would have been barred from joining
the employer as a co-defendant.
Contrary to this position, some courts have denied subrogation rights
a
to negligent employer 1 3 with the result that the negligent third party
escapes all liability. Since a subrogation action is partially for the benefit
of the employee, who is free from fault, this result seems fallacious.
Del. 1957); Cyr v. F. S. Payne Co., 112 F. Supp. 526 (D. Conn. 1953); Pacific
Indem. Co. v. California Elec. Works, Ltd., 29 Cal. App.zd 260, 84 P.2d 313 (1938) ;
Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Meisel, 85 Ga. App. 72, 68 S.E.zd 384 ('95i) ; Fidelity
& Cas. Co. v. Cedar Valley Elec. Co., 187 Iowa 014, 174 N.W. 709 (1919); Utley v.
Taylor & Gaskin, 305 Mich. 56z, 9 N.W.2d 842 (1943) 5 Nyquist v. Batcher, 235 Minn.
491, 51 N.W.2d 566 ("952); General Box Co. v. Missouri Util. Co., 331 Mo. 845, 55
S.W.2d 442 (1932); Graham v. City of Lincoln, xo6 Neb. 305, 183 N.W. 569 (191);
Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern California Petroleum Corp., 353 P.2d 358 (N.M. 19do) 1
Employers' Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Refined Syrups Sales Corp., 184 Misc. 94I, S3
N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 931, 58 N.Y.S.2d z16 (1945);
Clark v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R., 214 Wis. 295, z52 N.W. 685 (-934).
12 Of course, contributory negligence on the part of the employee will defeat a subrogation suit by the employer. Smith v. Henger, 148 Tex. 456, 226 S.W.2d 421
(-950).
" American Cas. Co. v. South Carolina Gas Co., 124 F. Supp. 30 (W.D.S.C.
1954); Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. United States, i o F. Supp. 937 (N.D. Fla.
1953), aff'd on other grounds, 211 F.zd 773 (sth Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.s.
855 (1954.) Alaimo v. DuPont, it Ill. App.2d 238, 136 N.E.zd 542 (x956); Hekman
Biscuit Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 291 Mich. x56, 289 N.W. 113 (939); contra
Utley v. Taylor & Gaskin, 305 Mich. 561, 9 N.W.2d 842 (1943) i Thornton Bros.
Co. v. Reese, 188 Minn. 5, 246 N.W. 527 (1933); but see Nyquist v. Batcher, 235
Minn. 491, 51 N.W.2d 566 (x952); Brown v. Southern Ry., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E.
419 (1933); United States Trucking Corp. v. New York & Pennsylvania Motor Express, Inc., 177 Misc. 377, 32 N.Y.S.zd 251 (Mun. Ct. 1941); contra Employers'
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Refined Syrup Sales Corp., 184 Misc. 941, 53 N.Y.S.2d 835
(Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 930, 5S N.Y.S.zd 216 (i945). See Note, 12
N.C.L. REV. 73 (933).
Although the English statute denied the employee a double recovery, Workmen's
Compensation Act, 19o6, 6 Edw. 7, c. 58, § 6, the leading English case did not give
a negligent employer the right of subrogation against a negligent third party. Cory
& Son, Ltd. v. France, Fenwick & Co., Ltd. [9igi] z K.B. 114. Cf. Tong v. Great
Northern Ry., 86 L.T.R. (n.s.) 8o2 (K.B. 1902) (double recovery denied to employee).
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However, if reimbursement of a negligent employer is viewed as
allowing contribution, 4 the rule against contribution between joint
tort-feasors 0 could be argued to bar refund to the employer.
It may be said that the court's literal application of the statute furthered the congressional intent to remove the litigation-breeding question of negligence from the employer-employee relationship.' 6 More7
over, the result in this case was satisfactory to Randall's widow.'
However, the decision does not appear to be an adequate adjustment of
the equities between the Government and the airline. From that standpoint, established rules of contribution and indemnity may offer a better
solution to this problem.
Courts have allowed the negligent third party to be indemnified by
the employer under certain conditions.' 8 The fact situation in Randall
" One court has so envisaged a subrogation suit.

Firemen's Fund Indem. Co. v.

United States, zio F. Supp. 937 (N.D. Fla. 1953), aff'd on other grounds z1 F.zd
773 (sth Cir. 2954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 855 0954).
. Halcyon Lines v. Haen Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (.952)
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 102 (937)
Note, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. z2.s (1952).
The fact situation in Randal, in which the employer is seeking indirect contribution
from a third party, is the exact opposite of that in the Halcyon: Lines case, supra,
in which the third party was proceeding against the employer, but if the third party is
not entitled to contribution, why should the employer be given this right?
The common law doctrines of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and
"fellow-servant" greatly diminished the employee's chances of recovery, x LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 4-.30 (5952), and congressional feeling opposed
these doctrines. 53 CONG. REC. io88s-921 (19x6).
" Other claimants recovered as much as $130,000 in tort damages from both
Eastern and the Government, while the widow collected only $37,500 from Eastern, out
of which she had to repay the $17,000 she had received in compensation. However,
had the widow not remarried and lived another thirty years (she was thirty-nine at
the time of RandalPs death) she would have received $95,300 in monthly payments
from the Government alone, with no litigation whatsoever.
The suggestion by the dissent in Randall, that the Government not be reimbursed,
due to its fault, overlooks the basic principle that workmen's compensation is in no
way based on fault. I LAISON, op. cit. supra, note 16 at § 3. Furthermore, if fault
on the part of the Government would bar refund from the employee, payees of FECA
compensation would doubtless continuously interpose negligence as a defense to obtain
a double recovery. Interjection of the negligence issue into the employer-employee
relationship is contrary to the basic purposes of the FECA. Although litigation of the
negligence issue could be avoided by denying refund only when the Government's
negligence is established by independent actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act, such
a rule would be unfair to government employees not fortunate enough to have a
separate determination that the Government was negligent. Moreover, allowance of
a double recovery would dearly frustrate congressional purpose. 53 CONG. REC. o912.
See also REISENFIELD & MAX WELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION, 417 (1950).
18E.g., United States v. Rothschild Int'l. Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 ( 9 th Cir.
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is similar to that of a case19 in which the court reasoned that the third
party's negligence was secondary, consisting only of failing to discover
the dangerous situation created by the primary negligence of the
employer."0 Here the legal theory consists of an implied promise by
the primary wrongdoer to indemnify the secondary wrongdoer if the
latter is compelled to pay damages. 2 ' However, another court has
rejected the primary-secondary distinction.22 In other jurisdictions,
courts have denied the negligent third party indemnity against the
employer in all compensation cases.23
i95o) (active superseding negligence by employer); Porello v. United States, 153
F.zd 607 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'd in part and ree'd in Part and remanded sub. nom.
American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947) (express contract of indemnity) ; Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal.zd zoo, 148 P.2d 633 (1944) (special legal relationship) ; Westchester Light Co. v. Westchester County Small Estates Corp., 278 N.Y.
'75, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938) (separate implied obligation to use due care).
9
" American Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 195o). The employer allowed a skylight to become encrusted with dirt. The third party fell through
the indiscernible skylight, injuring an employee, who received $6,8oo in compensation.
The employee's suit against the third party netted $6o,ooo, out of which the employer
was reimbursed as in Randall. This litigation went one step further and the third
party collected $6o,ooo from the employer, even though the exclusive remedy provision
of the statute stipulated that the employer's liability under the act, i.e., the $6,8o0,
"shall be exclusive, and in place of all other liability."
2' Eastern made a motion for leave to add the United States as a third party defendant, but this motion was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the test cases and
was never ruled on. Eastern could have urged that the tower operators' negligence in
allowing two aircraft to approach for landing at the same time was the primary negligence and that its pilot was only secondarily negligent in not discovering the dangerous
situation. See Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 196 U.S.
217, 222 (9o5) ; United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709, 716 (xoth Cir. 1954) ; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 95 (1937); Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tort.
But cf. Christie v.
feasors: .4 Proposed Rationale, 37 IowA L. REv. 517 (1952).
Powder Power Tool Corp., 124 F. Supp. 693 (D. Col. 1954), where it was held that the
United States, having paid compensation under the FECA, was not liable for contribution or indemnity sought by the third party plaintiff.
"Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 2o6 F.2d 784 (3rd Cir. 1953); WOODWARD,
LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACMS, § 259 (1913).
2

' Slattery v, Marra Bros., Inc., 186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. i951).
23E.g., Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 215 F.2d 368
(oth Cir. 1954) (no enforceable legal relationship) ; Christie v. Powder Power Tool
Corp., 124 F. Supp. 693 (D. Col. 1954) (terms of compensation act precluding indemnity); Criswell v. Seaman Body Corp., 233 Wis. 6o6, 29o N.W. 177 (1940)
(absence of common liability). It is also reasoned that to allow the third party, in
effect, to take a large recovery from the employer and give it to the employee is contra
to the policy of the workmen's compensation law. Reed v. New England Tel. & Tel.
Co., 175 F. Supp. 409 (D. N.H. 1958). The cases are in complete confusion on the
issue of indemnity. Compare McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh
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The preferable solution to the problem would be to allow, not indemnity, but contribution between the employer and the third party.
Previous attempts by third parties to obtain contribution have been met
with the argument that the payor of compensation should be wholly reimbursed, as he will pay compensation on many occasions when he would
have suffered no liability under common law. 24 Such reasoning, however valid in the context of the employee-employer relationship, would
appear specious when applied to a third party outside the benefits of an
insurance system. The employer's argument against contribution is that
his liability is fixed by law,2" but this is true only in regard to the employee. Between the employer and the third party there has been no
quid pro quo.26 Therefore, the scope of the statutory restriction on the
employer's liability to the employee should not be extended to allow the
negligent employer to be exonerated at the expense of the third party."
The exclusive liability provisions of the FECA might be interpreted
as placing a monetary ceiling on the employer's liability. If so, this
limit would not be frustrated by reducing the third party's tort liability
by the amount of the employer's compensation liability and denying the
employer reimbursement, as some courts have done.2 Although this
result would seem more equitable than that of Randall, it has been
Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959) 'with Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern California Petroleum Corp., 353 P.zd 358 (N.M. 196o).
"Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 411 0953).
2' For a discussion of cases denying the employee freedom from third party contribution and indemnity despite supposed "exclusive liability," see Plummer, THE ExcLusIVE
REMEDY OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS,

8 INS. COUNSEL J. 32 (1951).

" Consequently, the employer might be held for contribution pro tanto as to fault
or for half the damages. One court reached the latter conclusion, though the admiralty
rule of equal contribution was relied upon in part. Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 89 F.
Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1950), modified Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 ( 3 rd
Cir. 1951), rev'd Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S.
282 (1952).
Compare Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.zd 967 (3rd Cir. 1950)
qwith Brown & Root, Inc. v. United States, 9z F. SUPP. 257 (S.D. Tex. 195o), affd
198 F.zd 138 (5th Cir. 1952), as to whether the United States may be held for contribution on a derivative suit under the Tort Claims Act.
"7But cf. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.
1950).

'Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 (3rd Cir. i951), rev'd Halcyon Lines
v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 28z (1952); Coal Operators Cas.
Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 68x (E.D. Pa. 1947) Essick v. City of Lexington,
233 N.C. 6oo, 65 S.E.zd z2o (1951); Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. i8o, 14 A.zd io5
(1940). Contra, e.g., American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 18z F.zd 32z (2d

Cir.
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rejected by the Supreme Court29 in a case involving a similar federal
statute.30
The interpretation of workmen's compensation statutes should not
result in placing the entire cost of an industrial accident on a negligent
third party, when the employer is also negligent. Such a policy leaves
an employer in a better position when both he and a third party are
negligent than when no one is negligent. In a sense, that is "putting a
premium on negligence, instead of a penalty."'" Rather, the courts and
legislatures should reconcile the purposes and effect of workmen's com32
pensation acts with the equities supporting limited contribution
"Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S.

406, 411-12

(1953).

Contribution is

denied by the majority of states. Employers' Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Griffin Constr. Co.,
z8o S.W.2d 179 (Ky. .955); Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 977, 979 (qs55).
The usual
rationale is that the employer may not be liable to the third party for contribution since
he is not jointly liable to the employee in tort. z LARSON, op. cit. supra note x6,
§ 76.22. See generally Comment, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 522 (2958). Although widely
adhered to in compensation cases, this theory has been criticized as unconvincing.
Note, 64 HARV. L. REV. 492 (1951). The general rule denying contribution between
joint tort-feasors has incurred almost unanimous denunciation from the writers for
the last half-century. PROSSER, TORTS, 246 (x955).
See Bohlen, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNXL. L.Q. 552 (1936).
so Longshoremen's and Harborworker's Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C.

§§

901-50 (927).
1

" Randall v. United States, z8z F.zd 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 196o).
32A statutory enactment will doubtless be necessary to obtain contribution under
the FECA, in view of Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S.
28Z (x952).
However, states that have not passed on the question should be able to
apply the logic of the cases cited in note 28 supra.

